Abstract-The work presents a new signature scheme, called the multi-threshold signature, which generalizes the concept of multisignature and threshold signature. This scheme protects the anonymity of signers in a way the group signature doesin exceptional circumstances the identities of signers may be revealed. Due to the new party -completer, in our scheme the threshold size may vary together with the message to be signed. The presented scheme is based on the RSA signature standard, however other signature standards might be applied to it as well.
Introduction
Threshold and multiparty cryptography represent a wide and important area of the modern cryptography. The large part of it deals with the signature schemes such as threshold signatures and multisignatures. Threshold signatures (c.f. [3, 9] ) allow any group of l users to create a signature provided l ≥ t (where t is a threshold level, fixed in advance). The multisignature allow any group of members to sign the given message. The identities of signers are recognized in the verification phase and then the decision if the signature is accepted is made (see [1, [4] [5] [6] ). The verification of the signature applies the public keys of corresponding signers. This paper is motivated by the following problem: given the group G of cardinality l and the pair (m,t) we are interested in the cryptographic scheme that allows any subgroup of at least t members to sign the message m. In distinction to the common (t, l)-threshold type scheme, here the value of t is not fixed in advance, but may vary together with the message m to be signed. Thus it might be very useful in applications, where the number of members required to agree upon the given document depends for instance on the document's "priority". Another motivation is to propose the flexible signature scheme, which according to the requirement is anonymous or admits the signer's identification. This flexibility was not the subject of the previous papers, which generally speaking treat both solutions in separate schemes (c.f. [2] for example). From the practical point of view this ability seems to be significant in applications, and the proposed scheme provides the essential computational savings by joining both options within one cryptographic scheme. Therefore as an input for the signing algorithm is the triple (m,t, b), where b ∈ {0, 1} points out if the signature should be anonymous or with the signer's identification. The resulting signature is to be verified by any user applying the public key related to G. Similarly as in the conventional threshold signature scheme we require, that any subgroup of cardinality less than t is not able to generate the valid (i.e., accepted in the verification phase) signature, attached to the pair (m,t) (in fact it is not able to obtain any nontrivial information about the group G secret value related to its public key). In the conventional threshold signature the group public key corresponds to the given value of the threshold size t. The idea of our solution relies on the enlarging somewhat the original group G, so that the public key corresponds to the bigger threshold size t ′ . Then the additional shares (handled by the additional (trusted) party C) will ensure the valid threshold size t ≤ t ′ of the original signer's group. One could extend the above idea considering not necessarily trusted completer (e.g., C being another group of signers). Such a development in direction of dynamic groups was considered in [10] . The presented scheme is based on the RSA [7] cryptosystem, and the Shamir secret sharing protocol [8] . The paper contains the detailed description of the corresponding multi-threshold signature scheme and the proof of its correctness.
General system model

Participants
We assume there are three parties involved in the protocol:
2. The trusted dealer D responsible for the generation of private and public key of G and the corresponding shares for the group members P 1 , P 2 ..., P K and completer C.
3. The trusted completer C responsible for flexibility of the threshold level.
We assume that the dealer D is connected with the members P i and the completer C by the secure channels. Communication between C and members of G goes through group message board (GMB) where all the partial signatures are published (only C and G have an access to it).
Notation
Throughout the paper N is a positive integer such that:
By λ we denote the Carmichael lambda function defined as
, where:
Conventionally the elements e and d are mutually inverse elements in Z * λ (N) , i.e., ed ≡ 1 mod λ (N). We assume that every member P i ∈ G is equipped with the RSA keys (N i , e i , d i ), respectively, needed for the authentication process within corresponding parties or members. To assure the uniqueness of m ′ at the end of the verification process we assume that N 1 < N 2 < ... < N K :
, where ϖ i is the highest power of 2 dividing A i and ϖ = max i∈I ϖ i . Throughout the paper h will denote a given secure hash function.
Initialization phase
In the initialization phase the dealer D performs the following steps:
1. Generates the key pair (d, e) and a random polynomial:
Computes the shares
s i = f (x i )(A ′ i ) −1 mod λ (N) and sends them to P i (i ≤ K) and to C (for K + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K). Remark 1. Since min(p ′ , q ′ ) > 2K the odd numbers A ′ i are invertible mod λ (N).
Selects g ∈ Z *
N of order equal to λ (N) and sends g 4. He publishes the group public key gpk = (N, e, ϖ).
The anonymous signing phase
Assume that the tuple (m,t, b) (m is the message, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., K} is the threshold level and b ∈ {0, 1} points out the signature type (anonymous or with signers identification)), is given to G and C in order to be signed by a given subgroup of G. Then the following steps are performed: 
Lagrange coefficient for the group B.
When the signature σ B (m * ) (verified by any signer using gpk) occurs in the GMB, the anonymous signing is finished and σ B (m * ) is published.
The authorization phase
In the following part the members P i ∈ B authorize subsequently their signature using the private keys d i . We remark that the description of B contains the subscripts of the corresponding signers. They perform the following steps:
, signs it using his private key d 1 and sends the obtained ciphertext δ 1 = (m ′ ) d 1 mod N 1 to the second member P 2 .
2. P 2 verifies if (δ 1 ) e 1 ≡ m ′ mod N 1 if so, he computes δ 2 = (δ 1 ) d 2 mod N 2 and sends it to P 3 (otherwise he publishes in GMB information about this disagreement and stops the protocol).
3. Similarly P 3 verifies the obtained ciphertext δ 2 using the public keys (e 2 , N 2 ) and (e 1 , N 1 ), respectively, computes δ 3 = (δ 2 ) d 3 mod N 3 , sends it to P 4 and so on. ,t, σ ) , B, δ t ), where P i ∈ B are ordered as obove.
According to the requirements, the chosen member of the group G publishes the anonymous signature ((m,t, 0), σ ) or the full signature ((m,t, 1), σ , B, δ t ).
The anonymous signature does not imply any information about the identities of the members of B. It proves only that at least t members of group G have signed the document m.
The verification phase
After receiving the anonymous signature (m,t, σ ) the verifier uses the group public key 
It remains therefore to show that ∑ i∈B
In this connection we apply the Lagrange interpolation formula for
whose graph passes by the points
Hence in view of Eqs. (1) and (2) and definition of A ′ i we obtain:
To verify the full signature (m,t, σ , B, δ t ) we use the bijectivity of transformation x −→ x d i mod N i (1 ≤ i ≤ t) and the inequalities: 
Conclusions
Two basic benefits of the presented scheme are the scaleability (in threshold size) and generality -it might be useful for the applications typical for the threshold-type signatures or multisignatures. The final output is the pair: anonymous G-signature and the full signature (containing the signers' identifications). The completer can be regarded as a well protected machine which for the input value (m,t, b) outputs the corresponding partial signatures. As proved in [10] the multi-threshold device with C regarded as another group of signers could be developed in the direction of dynamic groups signatures schemes.
Appendix -an example 1. System parameters:
Dealer generates random polynomial:
f (x) = 3x 3 + 5x 2 + 7x + 39 and sets x i = i which implies:
3. We have:
4. Dealer, using the table above, computes: 
6. We assume that m * = h(m, 2, 0) = 7 and B = {2, 3, 4, 6}.
7. P 2 and P 3 generate and send to the completer their partial signatures: 
